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The familiar refrain about crisis laying bare underlying 
vulnerabilities and longstanding problems is certainly true with respect to 
the COVID-19 pandemic and voting rights lawyering. While it was clear 
before the pandemic that voting rights lawyering is in crisis,1 election 
litigation flowing from the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic makes 
painfully clear the crisis state of voting rights lawyering in the United 
States. 
 
 †  Ph.D. candidate in political science, Stanford University; J.D. Stanford Law School 
(2016). From 2017-19, I worked as Skadden Fellow at the ACLU Voting Rights Project; dur-
ing the fall of 2020, I returned as a temporary staff attorney. I did not litigate any of the 
COVID-19-related cases described in this Article; it is dedicated to the many voting rights 
lawyers who did. I owe this Article to the editors of the CUNY Law Review, who encouraged 
me to contribute to this issue. And I thank my editor, Rachel Kreutzer, and her team for their 
gracious suggestions and careful edits. 
 1 Much voting rights scholarship is devoted to addressing the inadequate and precarious 
state of laws protecting the right to vote. For a sample, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Future 
of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741 
(2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting 
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006); RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM 
FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2013); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universal-
ism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014); 
Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363 (2015); Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, 
Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763 
(2016); Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting 
Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867 (2016); Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The 
New Vote Denial Litigation Since Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J. F. 799 (2018). 
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Ensuring that voters could vote safely and confidently during a pan-
demic required that election officials make significant adjustments to how 
elections are typically administered. Applying the pandemic motto of so-
cial distancing to voting, voters had to be spread out across time (so voting 
is not all concentrated on Election Day)2 and across various modes of vot-
ing (so voting does not all occur in person).3 Preventing congestion on 
Election Day transformed from an advisable election objective4 to a pub-
lic health imperative.5 The pandemic challenged election administrators 
to respond nimbly with necessary adjustments to election practices. And 
it issued a mandate to voting rights lawyers to litigate where possible to 
ensure that states made these necessary adjustments. 
But the ability of voting rights lawyers to obtain necessary relief 
when state election laws fall short depends on robust legal protections for 
voting rights. Even before the pandemic, such protections had been in a 
steady state of decay.6 The nullification of the Voting Rights Act’s pre-
clearance regime, which required certain jurisdictions with a history of 
racial discrimination to preclear changes to election laws with the Depart-
ment of Justice,7 unleashed a cascade of voter suppression laws.8 That 
many of these laws have survived protracted and serious legal challenges 
has long made clear the formidable barriers in the way of voting rights 
lawyering.9 
 
 2 States principally do so through implementing early voting, which permits voting to 
begin before Election Day. See State Laws Governing Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/V6FM-8FYU. 
 3 States principally do so through allowing absentee voting. See Voting Outside the Poll-
ing Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home Options, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/F674-Y9QP. 
 4 See SPENCER OVERTON & JENALYN SOTTO, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. 
STUDIES, REDUCING LONG LINES TO VOTE (Aug. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/V6W4-Y7AN. 
 5 Guidance for Organizing Large Events and Gatherings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/XKJ8-7YKD (last updated Mar. 8, 2021); Polling Locations 
and Voters, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/8H4U-76CT (last 
updated Jan. 4, 2021). 
 6 See supra note 1. 
 7 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537, 557 (2013) (striking down the coverage 
formula that put certain jurisdictions under the preclearance regime, thereby rendering the 
preclearance regime a nullity). 
 8 These laws have been collectively dubbed the “New Vote Denial.” See Tokaji, supra 
note 1, at 691-92. 
 9 See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2018) (releasing Texas’s voter ID 
law from injunctive relief); Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming invalidation 
of Wisconsin’s provision allowing students to use their university-issued IDs to vote); Husted 
v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018) (upholding Ohio’s use-it-or-lose-it voter 
purge regime). To be sure, there have been notable successes. See, e.g., North Carolina State 
Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
1399 (2017) (holding unconstitutional North Carolina’s omnibus voter suppression law); Fish 
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Despite these barriers, when states insisted on conducting elections 
as usual, even in the midst of a pandemic, there was hope that lawsuits 
brought to adapt voting to pandemic constraints would prevail. While the 
pandemic did not change the law, it did significantly alter the facts that 
most voters faced on the ground. The cost-benefit and risk-assessment 
calculus of voting, as with almost every other aspect of life,10 changed 
overnight. Any expectation that elections should proceed unchanged in a 
pandemic seemed unrealistic and unreasonable. Thus, even though pan-
demic-related voting rights cases faced tough legal standards, the hope 
was that the drastic and apparent need for adjustments to preexisting elec-
tion rules would produce some important legal victories. 
Yet the election litigation that occurred during the COVID-19 pan-
demic only confirmed just how hard voting rights lawyering has become. 
Cases brought to compel states to adopt pandemic-necessitated changes 
to their election rules and practices experienced little success—even 
though they sought very modest remedies.11 Also, there was significant 
litigation coming from the other direction: litigants challenging the intro-
duction of measures taken to make voting easier, for instance, the intro-
duction of vote-by-mail or the relaxation of certain requirements for mail-
in ballots.12 
The paucity of successful reform litigation coupled with the multi-
tude of obstructionist lawsuits during the pandemic makes painfully clear 
that the law is getting in the way of voting rights lawyering. In particular, 
three doctrines—one notorious, one novel, and one neglected—are of 
note. They are, in turn, the Purcell principle (“that federal courts ordinar-
ily should not alter state election laws in the period close to an elec-
tion”),13 the Independent State Legislature Theory (which would “re-
quire[] federal courts to ensure that state courts do not rewrite state 
election laws”),14 and Anderson/Burdick, the standard governing the right 
to vote under the federal constitution.15 In toto, these doctrines produce 
 
v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 965 (2020) (holding un-
constitutional Kansas’s documentary proof of citizenship requirement for voter registration). 
 10 See, e.g., Tara Parker-Pope, Who Knew Grocery Shopping Could Be So Stressful?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/6KFF-NCY5; Q&As on COVID-19 and Related 
Health Topics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://perma.cc/SJD5-6JRY (addressing questions 
about breastfeeding, health and safety in the workplace, home care for families and caregivers, 
mass gatherings, schools, and staying and working at hotels, among other topics.). 
 11 See infra Section I(B). 
 12 See infra Section I(B). 
 13 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 30 (2020) (Ka-
vanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay). 
 14 Id. at 34 n.1. 
 15 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (establishing the reigning standard 
governing the federal right to vote); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (applying the 
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more than a legal presumption in favor of the electoral regime a state 
chooses to enact. They legitimate it, even if the regime impedes the exer-
cise of the right to vote. 
This Article is organized as follows. In the first section, I describe 
what voting rights lawyering has looked like in this latest crisis, the 
COVID-19 pandemic. I begin by noting the kinds of changes to electoral 
rules and regulations that a pandemic necessitates: those that reduce the 
concentration of voters in a physical polling location. Then, I take stock 
of the election litigation that resulted from the pandemic, including ob-
structionist litigation aimed at preventing necessary changes from being 
implemented in pandemic elections and reform litigation aimed at secur-
ing the necessary changes for holding pandemic elections. While obstruc-
tionist litigation proliferated through the federal courts, reform litiga-
tion—which sought modest changes—largely failed. 
In the second section, I consider the state of crisis of voting rights 
lawyering that the pandemic has illuminated. I describe three culprits: the 
Purcell principle, the Independent State Legislature Theory, and the 
Anderson/Burdick standard. In particular, I focus on the Anderson/Bur-
dick standard governing protections for the federal right to vote, our last 
legal line of defense for the right to vote. I argue that while the standard 
is theoretically sound, in application it does little more than legitimate 
state election laws regardless of whether they impinge on the right to vote. 
Bringing voting rights lawyering out of crisis—and making sure it is 
ready to face the next crisis, whatever it may be—will require deep fixes 
to doctrines governing the right to vote and how they are applied. 
I. VOTING RIGHTS LAWYERING DURING CRISIS 
A. Voting in a Pandemic 
The COVID-19 pandemic threw into question whether voters could 
safely and confidently cast their ballots during the 2020 election cycle in 
 
standard for evaluating a claim that a state law burdens the right to vote as set forth in Ander-
son).               . 
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the United States.16 The iconic image of voting in America—the congre-
gation of voters at the polls on Election Day—no longer made sense.17 At 
the very least, some accommodations needed to be made for individuals 
who are especially vulnerable to the virus.18 Reducing demand for in-per-
son voting was also consistent with stay-at-home orders19 and the public 
health principle of social distancing.20 In short, our elections needed to 
adapt to pandemic conditions. 
The need to adapt was acute but also unexceptional. The pandemic 
forced us to change almost every part of how we go about our lives.21 
Many institutions—be it proactively22 or forced kicking and scream-
ing23—adjusted to changing needs as dictated by the pandemic as well. 
 
 16 The election cycle began with the 2020 primary elections, many of which were held 
after the pandemic hit. See, e.g., the Wisconsin primary, Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Demo-
cratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam) (staying the District Court’s order 
granting a preliminary injunction to the extent it required the State to count absentee ballots 
postmarked after April 7, 2020, the date of the state’s election). And it ended with the general 
election held in November of 2020, with COVID cases rising to a third peak. Lauren 
Leatherby, U.S. Virus Cases Climb Toward a Third Peak, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/7CUU-QU8E. 
 17 See Polling Locations and Voters, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://perma.cc/VKJ5-BBDG (Jan. 4, 2021). 
 18 See People at Increased Risk and Other People Who Need to Take Extra Precautions, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/F9ME-46QC (last updated 
Mar. 15, 2021) (including older individuals, pregnant people, and those who suffer from un-
derlying medical conditions). 
 19 Such orders, typically issued at the state level, require persons to stay home as a com-
munity mitigation strategy to reduce the spread of the disease. See AMANDA MORELAND ET 
AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TIMING OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL COVID-
19 STAY-AT-HOME ORDERS AND CHANGES IN POPULATION MOVEMENT—UNITED STATES, 
MARCH 1-MAY 31, 2020 (Sept. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/SMS7-2JHD. 
 20 Social Distancing: Keep a Safe Distance to Slow the Spread, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z4Q8-UASH. 
 21 How Coronavirus Is Changing Our Daily Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020, 2:20 PM), 
https://perma.cc/FT9V-XWM8 (describing changes to grocery shopping, professional and 
amateur sports, cultural activities and institutions, social gatherings, schooling, and dining 
out); see Larry Buchanan, 54 Ways Coronavirus Has Changed Our World, N.Y. TIMES (May 
27, 2020), https://perma.cc/B58L-DX2D (summarizing the many changes to our lives under 
COVID-19). 
 22 See, e.g., Lawrence S. Bacow et al., We Lead Three Universities. It’s Time for Drastic 
Action, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/8F6F-G9N5 (“Experts advised us that 
to slow the spread of the virus, we must reduce population density and increase social distanc-
ing on our campuses. That meant turning university life upside down: suddenly sending vir-
tually all of our undergraduates home; asking faculty to swiftly bring all instruction online; 
canceling academic, athletic, artistic and cultural events, and nearly all in-person meetings; 
shutting our libraries; and asking everyone who could work remotely to do so right away.”). 
 23 See, e.g., Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Special Collection: COVID-19 (Novel Corona-
virus), C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://perma.cc/ES8B-5TT8 (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) 
(compiling extensive litigation addressing challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic); see 
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Many of these adjustments, for instance migrating almost all in-person 
contact online, were arguably far more drastic than those that election ad-
ministration needed to make. But because of the highly fragmented and 
local nature of the United States’ election policy and practice, adjusting 
elections to the pandemic required action by many policy actors.24 More-
over, not only were the actors numerous, but the problems they faced were 
also varied. Because there is significant variation across the country on 
what modes of voting are available, and how convenient voting was to 
begin with,25 the need—and capability—to adjust varied greatly across 
jurisdictions. 
Many jurisdictions rose to the occasion. To reduce the demand for 
in-person voting, they made other modes of voting more accessible to 
more voters. Vote-by-mail (synonymous with absentee voting),26 already 
an increasingly popular method of voting,27 became the pandemic gold 
standard for voting.28 Vote-by-mail allowed voters to cast ballots in the 
tranquility of their homes (and within their metaphorical pandemic bub-
bles), reducing both the risk that voters could become infected and the 
risk that voters could infect each other.29 Some states that had not already 
fully embraced vote-by-mail prior to the pandemic expanded the availa-
bility of vote-by-mail during the pandemic.30 Kentucky, for instance, in-
troduced no-excuse absentee voting during the pandemic.31 Prior to the 
 
also Prison Policy Initiative, Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic, https://perma.cc/A9AQ-
QUYC (last updated Mar. 30, 2021) (collecting policy changes in prisons and jails in light of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, many of which were compelled by court orders). 
 24 Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated by the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, and How to Treat and Cure Them, 19 ELECTION L.J. 263, 265-68 
(2020). 
 25 See NCSL State Elections Resources, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
https://perma.cc/7Q4P-WYN7 (last updated Jan. 5, 2021) (providing an overview of the dif-
ferences across states in how elections are conducted). 
 26 See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, What’s the Difference Between Absentee and Mail-in Vot-
ing?, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/989Q-VAAE; Voting Outside 
the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home Options, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/NN4Q-XLLM (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). 
 27 Nichelle Williams, Vote By Mail Trends and Turnout in Six Election Cycles: 2008-
2018, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N (Oct. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/T28H-6GER. 
 28 See infra Section I. Vote-by-mail was not only the gold standard for voting in the 
United States but also across the globe. See MANUEL WALLY, INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL 
SYS., VOTE BY MAIL: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE DURING COVID-19 5 (2020), 
https://perma.cc/7P76-4525. 
 29 Elections Project Staff, Minimizing COVID-19 Health Risks When Voting, BIPARTISAN 
POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/PQ9G-HPKS. 
 30 Drew DeSilver, Mail-in Voting Became Much More Common in 2020 Primaries as 
COVID-19 Spread, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Oct. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/3JZN-9BD8. 
 31 Executive Order 2020-688, State of Emergency Relating to Kentucky Elections (Aug. 
14, 2020), available at: https://perma.cc/R2UB-KBRY. For news coverage of the order, see 
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pandemic, any voter seeking to vote absentee, e.g., cast a ballot by mail, 
needed to satisfy several excuse conditions, for instance absence from the 
jurisdiction on Election Day or an excused inability to physically make it 
to the polls.32 In light of the pandemic, the state made absentee voting 
available to all registered voters.33 Some other states even affirmatively 
mailed ballots to voters,34 giving individual voters notice that this safer, 
distanced option for voting was available and encouraging them to take 
advantage of it. Another safer—and more distinctly American—mode of 
voting that some jurisdictions introduced during the pandemic was drive-
through voting.35 
Some states also took measures to facilitate and encourage the use of 
vote-by-mail. One such example is relaxing the witness requirement for 
mail-in ballots. Some states, for instance Minnesota, had a long-standing 
requirement that absentee ballots be witnessed.36 But it made sense to do 
away with this requirement in a pandemic, when “it is reasonable to con-
clude” that “requiring voters who live alone to place their lives and health 
in danger” by finding a witness for their absentee ballots “impermissibly 
and irrationally denies the fundamental right to vote to those individuals 
while there is still ongoing community transmission of COVID-19.”37 In 
order to make absentee voting a viable and safe option for voters, states 
 
USA Today, Kentucky election board finalizes approval of bipartisan voting plan (Aug. 20, 
2020), available at: https://perma.cc/N7PD-KAUZ. 
 32 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 117.085. 
 33 Supra note 31. 
 34 Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., v. Way, 492 F.Supp.3d 354, 362 (D.N.J. 2020); 
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., v. Cegavske, 488 F.Supp.3d 993, 1002 (D. Nev. 2020). 
 35 Hotze v. Hollins, No. 4:20-CV-03709, 2020 WL 6437668, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 
2020) (finding drive-through voting permissible during early voting). 
 36 See Vote Early By Mail, OFF. MINN. SEC’Y ST. STEVE SIMON, https://perma.cc/H297-
TXH6 (last visited Mar. 1, 2021) (describing the usual requirement that vote-by-mail ballots 
be witnessed by “a registered Minnesota voter or a notary.”); Andy Monserud, Minnesota 
Waives Witness Requirement for November Mail-in Ballots, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 
3, 2020), https://perma.cc/X22T-KJ9D (describing the suspension of the witness requirement 
in the November 2020 General Election). Other states with such a requirement include North 
Carolina, Moore v. Circosta, No. 5:20-CV-507-D, 2020 WL 5880129, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 
2020) (challenging N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-231(a) (2019), which requires that a completed ab-
sentee ballot be signed by two witnesses or be notarized), and Alabama, People First of Ala-
bama v. Merrill, No. 2:20-CV-00619-AKK, 2020 WL 5814455 at *2, *28 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 
30, 2020) (finding that a witness requirement requiring voters to sign an absentee ballot affi-
davit in the presence of two witnesses, Ala. Code § 17-11-10(b), violated the First Amendment 
right to vote and the Voting Rights Act as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic). 
 37 NAACP Minnesota-Dakotas Area State Conference v. Simon, No. 62-CV-20-3625, at 
*21 (D. Minn. Aug 3, 2020). 
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needed to, and sometimes did, relax absentee voting requirements38 be-
cause requiring strict adherence to them presented risk of infection and 
strained voters’ decision to vote absentee. 
All of these examples make the simple point that when external 
conditions, such as a pandemic, produce impediments to voting, election 
administration must make changes to the way it ordinarily conducts 
elections. Indeed, denizens of a democracy should be able to take these 
changes for granted. Certainly, denizens of other democracies take them 
for granted. New Zealand, like the United States, also held its general 
election during a pandemic.39 And even though community spread in New 
Zealand was far less prevalent than in the United States,40 New Zealand 
made various significant adjustments to its election administration.41 The 
adjustments included making special provisions for vulnerable voters 
(e.g., those who are “in a rest home,” “in hospital,” “in a managed 
isolation or quarantine facility,” “in self-isolation,” in “prison,” or 
“overseas”) to varyingly vote by mail, vote in advance, and even vote by 
phone.42 They also included increasing early voting days,43 adding polling 
 
 38 See, e.g., Mays v. Thurston, No. 4:20-CV-341 JM, 2020 WL 1531359 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 
30, 2020) (concerning Arkansas’s extension of time for voters to request an absentee ballot); 
League of Women Voters of Virginia. v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 481 F.Supp.3d 580, 
581 (W.D. Va. 2020) (approving a consent decree enjoining the witness signature requirement 
for at-risk voters unable to safely have a witness present while completing their ballot). 
 39 See Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand Election: Voters Head to the Polls, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/VQU2-UUXZ. New Zealand held its general election on Oc-
tober 16, 2020. 
 40 As of two weeks before the election, New Zealand had gone 102 days with no detected 
cases of COVID-19 and had only seven active domestic cases. Rebecca Falconer, Polls Open 
in New Zealand’s “Covid Election,” AXIOS (Oct. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/PQ2D-WGXA. 
By contrast, the 2020 U.S. election was held while the country’s infection rate was high, sur-
passing 100,000 daily cases for the first time on November 4. See Jason Silverstein, U.S. Re-
ported More COVID-19 Cases in November than Most Countries Had All Year, CBS NEWS 
(Nov. 30, 2020, 3:26 PM), https://perma.cc/EQY3-CK3A. 
 41 The New Zealand Electoral Commission took precautions including social distancing, 
use of hand sanitizer and single-use pens to mark ballots, extended early voting by two days, 
and added more voting places, operating nationally as if there were community spread. Fal-
coner, supra note 40. While the focus of this Article is not on the public health implications 
of voting, it is worth noting that New Zealand not only tried to make voting safer for voters, 
it also conducted contact tracing at polling places in order to detect and prevent any commu-
nity spread of the virus. See COVID-19, 2020 General Election, We’re Making Voting Places 
Safer, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20201128163308/https://vote.nz
/voting/2020-general-election/covid-19/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2020). 
 42 Covid-19, 2020 General Election, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://web.archive.org/web
/20201128163308/https://vote.nz/voting/2020-general-election/covid-19/ (last visited Nov. 
28, 2020). 
 43 Falconer, supra note 40. 
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locations to reduce the number of voters casting ballots at the same 
time44—and offering a surprisingly fragrant hand sanitizer.45 
A comparative example is instructive because it highlights not only 
what is done in other countries, but also what is taken for granted there. 
After all, in a democracy it is reasonable to expect that facilitating and 
enabling voter participation should occur without fanfare or controversy. 
But what is true for New Zealand is far from true in the United States. 
What states elect to do, instead of what voters need, dictates election prac-
tices and policies here. Indeed, that has become an accepted feature, not 
a bug, of our democracy. A back and forth that occurred between Justice 
Kavanaugh and the Vermont Secretary of State in one of the 2020 shadow 
docket election cases illuminates just how much we tolerate states under-
serving their voters.46 In the part of his concurring opinion describing “our 
constitutional system of federalism,” Justice Kavanaugh noted that while 
some state legislatures exercised their authority in light of the pandemic 
to “change[] their election rules for the November 2020 election . . . . 
[o]ther States such as Vermont, by contrast, have decided not to make 
changes to their ordinary election rules . . . .”47 
Justice Kavanaugh turned out to be wrong about Vermont.48 As a 
letter from the Vermont Secretary of State to the Court seeking a correc-
tion made clear, Vermont made “two significant changes to [its] ordinary 
election rules in response to the pandemic,” including mailing every ac-
tive registered voter a ballot and a prepaid return envelope, and processing 
ballots received before Election Day earlier than before.49 Yet, the true 
 
 44 Covid-19, 2020 General Election, We’re Making Voting Places Safer, ELECTORAL 
COMM’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20201128163308/https://vote.nz/voting/2020-general-
election/covid-19/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2020). 
 45 Charlotte Graham-McLay, ‘Scent of Democracy’: Fragrant Hand Sanitiser Ticks Box 
for New Zealand’s Early Voters, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://perma.cc/F2TQ-
S3SJ. 
 46 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 32-33 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see Letter from Jim Condos, Vt. Sec’y of State, to Scott S. Harris, 
Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/KUB4-RNDK 
(seeking correction); Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 32 (Oct. 28, 2020, 7:47 PM) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring), https://perma.cc/39GK-YDAV (correcting opinion); Press Re-
lease, Jim Condos, Vt. Sec’y of State, Vermont Secretary of State Jim Condos Issues State-
ment in Response to Correction of Justice Kavanaugh’s Incorrect Opinion (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/ASW2-MBZW (responding to correction). For a full write-up of the ex-
change, see Alexa Corse, Vermont Election Official Asks Supreme Court to Correct Justice 
Kavanaugh, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2020, 8:39 PM), https://perma.cc/ZPF8-CE6H. 
 47 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 32. 
 48 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (Oct. 28, 2020, 
7:47 PM), https://perma.cc/39GK-YDAV (correcting opinion). 
 49 Letter from Jim Condos, Vt. Sec’y of State, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of Court, Supreme 
Court of the U.S. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/KUB4-RNDK. 
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embarrassment of the exchange was not Justice Kavanaugh’s mistake,50 
but that a state doing nothing at all to ensure that voters can vote during a 
pandemic should be cited as an unexceptional fact. 
To be sure, Justice Kavanaugh’s position in the case is not law. But 
it demonstrates that the issue of whether, how much, and under what con-
ditions states have to facilitate the exercise of our fundamental right to 
vote is hotly contested. Indeed, many states that adopted some change to 
how they administer elections during the pandemic were sued for doing 
so.51 And almost every kind of policy change described previously,52 and 
more,53 was the target of litigation. In addition to obstructionist litigation 
to prevent the implementation of changes, voting rights groups, partisan 
organizations, and private citizens also brought reform litigation to com-
pel jurisdictions to relieve onerous burdens on the right to vote in light of 
the pandemic.54 But that litigation, especially those brought by voting 
rights lawyers, can be fairly described as modest in scope and in remedy 
sought. 
B. Election Litigation During the Pandemic 
Specifically, two sets of lawsuits are worth highlighting. The first set 
sought to protect individuals rendered vulnerable in the voting process by 
the pandemic. The flagship case in this set is People First of Alabama v. 
Merrill, challenging, among other things, Alabama’s witness requirement 
for absentee ballots (a notary or two witnesses) and the state’s ban on 
 
 50 After all, the drafting period for the Court’s opinions for emergency election litigation 
is extremely truncated: the Court’s opinion was issued ten days after both parties’ briefs were 
filed. Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://perma.cc/MDD8-VNWT (last visited Mar. 1, 2021) (noting that the response to the 
application to vacate stay was filed on October 16, 2020, and the Court’s opinion was issued 
on October 26, 2020). 
 51 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 31, 35, 37. 
 52 In addition to the cases cited in note 51, see also Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Fontes, 
No. CV2020-003477 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cnty. Mar. 13, 2020) (prohibiting the mail-
ing of early ballots to every registered voter in Maricopa County, Arizona); Ariz. Pub. Integ-
rity All. v. Fontes, 475 P.3d 303, 305-06 (Ariz. 2020) (challenging the new overvote instruc-
tion for mail-in ballots directing voters to draw a line through the incorrect candidate’s name 
and oval and fill in the oval next to the corrected selection). 
 53 See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, Ohio ex rel. Speweik v. Wood Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 141 
N.E.3d 240 (Ohio 2020) (challenging Ohio’s change of primary date due to the COVID-19 
pandemic in the first month of the pandemic). 
 54 In addition to those described infra, see, e.g., Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-CV-01552-
JMC, No. 3:20-CV-01730-JMC, 2020 WL 2617329 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020) (challenging wit-
ness requirement); Black Voters Matter Fund v. Raffensperger, 478 F. Supp. 3d 1278 (N.D. 
Ga. 2020) (challenging requirement to buy postage for mail-in ballot); Missouri State Confer-
ence of the NAACP v. State, No. 20AC-CC00169 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Cole Cnty., May 15, 2020) 
(seeking no-excuse absentee voting in light of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
2021] VOTING RIGHTS LAWYERING IN CRISIS 133 
curbside voting.55 Curbside voting, also synonymous with drive-through 
voting, allows voters to cast their ballot in person but outside the polling 
location without leaving the car (and hence remaining in the safety of their 
bubble).56 Plaintiffs contended, with evidence that the court credited, that 
the challenged provisions imposed burdens on the ability of certain high-
risk groups, for instance those over 65, those with disabilities, and those 
with underlying medical conditions, to cast their votes safely and confi-
dently.57 While these provisions were preliminarily enjoined by the dis-
trict court,58 they were in effect during the July 14 runoff election59 and 
the general election.60 
That Merrill did not prevail to secure necessary relief for affected 
voters is dispiriting. The case was brought on behalf of vulnerable voters 
who needed judicial relief in order to exercise their right to vote.61 Mr. 
Howard Porter Jr., one of the individual plaintiffs in the case, is at signif-
icantly elevated risk of complications or death from COVID-19: he is 
Black man in his seventies who has asthma and Parkinson’s disease, 
which makes it difficult for him to walk.62 He lost both his sister and uncle 
to COVID-19 and was justifiably “very fearful about becoming in-
fected.”63 Mr. Porter’s “earnestly expressed” views encapsulate what was 
at stake in the lawsuit well: “[S]o many of my [ancestors] even died to 
vote. And while I don’t mind dying to vote, I think we’re past that—we’re 
past that time.”64 
Alabama’s witness requirement is especially onerous and pandemic-
inappropriate, requiring either a notary or two witnesses.65 By its terms, it 
required isolated individuals and couples (who do not happen to be nota-
ries) to come into contact with at least one individual outside of their 
household.66  Moreover, the relief issued by the district court in the case 
was ultimately very limited. The preliminary injunction only waived the 
witness requirement for: 
 
 55 People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1192 (N.D. Ala. 2020). 
 56 See id. at 1192. 
 57 See id. at 1207-08, 1213-14. 
 58 In fact, the law was enjoined twice by the district court. People First of Alabama v. 
Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Ala. 2020) (for general election); People First of Alabama, 
467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (for run-off election). 
 59 Merrill v. People First of Alabama, 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020). 
 60 Merrill v. People First of Alabama, 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020). 
 61 See People First of Alabama, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 1109-15 (describing individuals espe-
cially vulnerable to COVID-19). 
 62 Id. at 1109. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1092. 
 65 Id. at 1091. 
 66 See id. at 1118, 1123, 1125. 
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[A]bsentee voters who determine it is impossible or unreasonable 
to safely satisfy that requirement in light of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, and who provide a written statement signed by the voter 
under penalty of perjury that he or she suffers from an underlying 
medical condition that the Centers for Disease Control has deter-
mined places individuals at a substantially higher risk of develop-
ing severe cases or dying of COVID-19 . . . .67 
As for curbside voting, the injunction merely precluded the state 
from maintaining a ban on the practice.  It did not affirmatively require 
any election officials to offer curbside voting opportunities;68 it simply 
permitted jurisdictions to offer them if desired.69 
The second (and voluminous) set of lawsuits concerned the deadline 
by which absentee ballots must be returned. That issue became a flash-
point for election controversies during the 2020 Election Season.70 States 
that extended the deadline got sued (e.g., Pennsylvania and North Caro-
lina),71 and plaintiffs sued states for maintaining stringent deadlines that 
required ballots to be received by Election Day (e.g., Wisconsin).72 In 
light of concerns over the alacrity and reliability of the Postal Service,73 a 
 
 67 People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 467 F.Supp.3d 1179, 1226-27 (N.D. Ala. 2020). 
 68 Id. at 1227. 
 69 Id. at 1192. 
 70 Of the election law controversies that made it onto the Supreme Court’s shadow docket, 
a majority concerned extensions of states’ absentee ballot receipt deadlines. See Edward Fo-
ley, Symposium: The Particular Perils of Emergency Election Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 23, 
2020, 5:28 PM), https://perma.cc/7FX5-DKKX (describing shadow docket cases, most of 
which are the absentee ballot receipt deadline cases cited infra). 
 71 See, e.g., Scarnati v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 644 (2020) (mem.) (denying application to 
stay Pennsylvania Supreme Court injunction allowing ballots received up to the Friday after 
Election Day to be counted if postmarked by Nov. 3); Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. 
Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1 (2020); Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 47 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (mem.) (noting that the North Carolina challenge concerned state actors other than 
the legislature—including the State Board of Elections—issuing “their own addition and sup-
plemental set of amendments to state election laws,” including extending “the absentee ballot 
receipt deadline by six days . . . .”). While I primarily focus on the lawsuits concerning Wis-
consin’s and Pennsylvania’s deadlines, there were lawsuits concerning deadlines from other 
states as well. See, e.g., Carson v. Simon, 494 F. Supp. 3d 589 (D. Minn. 2020), reversed and 
remanded, 978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020) (granting plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunc-
tion and blocking Minnesota’s absentee ballot receipt deadline extension). 
 72 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (seeking 
relief from, among other things, Wisconsin’s extended absentee ballot receipt deadline during 
the primary election); see also Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 
S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.) (rejecting request to strike down Seventh Circuit’s stay of an injunc-
tion extending November election mail-in ballot deadline). 
 73 The problems with USPS for the delivery of absentee ballots were so grave that the 
postal service itself became the subject of voting rights litigation. See Jones v. U. S. Postal 
Serv., 488 F. Supp. 3d 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). These issues were also fleshed out in the absentee 
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modified deadline requiring that ballots be postmarked by Election Day 
and received up to a week subsequent would ensure that voters were not 
penalized for delays beyond their control. 
Ballot receipt deadlines were extensively litigated in the 2020 Elec-
tion season and responsible for many heated opinions and statements from 
the Supreme Court.74 And they gave rise to the Independent State Legis-
lature Theory, a novel theory that I discuss further in the next Section.75 
But to follow up on my observation about the modesty of what plaintiffs 
sought in Merrill, the same is true, in some limited respects, about what 
was at issue in the ballot receipt deadline cases. To be sure, the stakes of 
whether those ballots would be counted were high.76 But whether plain-
tiffs objecting to relaxed deadlines, or those seeking them, prevailed in 
each case would result in very limited changes to election administration. 
The ballot receipt deadline does not interfere with the preparation of elec-
tions, only with which ballots are counted.77 And it does not require that 
election administrators adopt any new procedures since ballots are pro-
cessed and counted exactly in the same way. While accepting more ballots 
no doubt increases the volume of work on election workers, the number 
of additional ballots is a rounding error compared to the number of ballots 
processed for the entire election.78 
Looking back on what was not successfully achieved through voting 
rights lawyering highlights just how formidable the barriers are. That lim-
 
ballot receipt deadline cases. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., v. Way, 492 
F. Supp. 3d 354, 360-61(D.N.J. 2020) (describing problems the State experienced during the 
July 2020 Primary Election arising from the USPS’s postmarking practices); Democratic Nat’l 
Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 44-45 (2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(mem.) (noting Postal Service delays and the associated effects, including increased risk that 
voters will be unable to return mail-in ballots by Election Day). 
 74 See cases cited supra notes 71 & 72. 
 75 See infra Section II. 
 76 The mobilization of both major political parties in the litigation over whether the dead-
line can and should be extended is evident from the case names: the political parties served as 
the parties to litigation, e.g., “Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,” and 
“Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature.” 
 77 Typically, administrative burdens are heavy on election administrators during the “hec-
tic period before elections,” and, of course, on Election Day itself. Barry C. Burden, et al., The 
Effect of Administrative Burden on Bureaucratic Perception of Policies: Evidence from Elec-
tion Administration, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 741, 746-48 (2012). 
 78 As an example, in Pennsylvania, only 10,000 mail ballots arrived during a three-day 
post-Election Day grace period. Jonathan Lai, Only 10,000 Pa. Mail Ballots Arrived After 
Election Day—Far Too Few to Change the Result If Thrown Out, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 11, 
2020), https://perma.cc/VG6Y-C6EJ. Those ballots constituted around 0.14% of the total bal-
lots cast in the state. See Pennsylvania’s Election Stats, PA. DEP’T ST., https://perma.cc/N8B2-
9SNV (last visited May 21, 2020) (noting that almost seven million votes were cast and 
counted in the 2020 Election in Pennsylvania). 
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ited carve-outs for vulnerable voters could not be secured through litiga-
tion in a pandemic shows just how hard it is to represent vulnerable clients 
in voting rights cases under noncrisis circumstances. Taking stock of what 
was litigated and controversial before the Supreme Court in the last elec-
tion shines a light on the role that law and doctrine has played in forming 
those barriers. That precious judicial resources were spent not on clarify-
ing the responsibility that states have in ensuring that everyone who has 
the right to vote can exercise it, but on deciding whether validly cast bal-
lots arriving behind schedule should be counted, reveals some unfortunate 
truths about the state of our laws governing voting rights. 
II. VOTING RIGHTS LAWYERING IN A STATE OF CRISIS 
A. Notorious & Novel Legal Devices 
For a while now, our laws have been getting in the way of voting 
rights lawyering. The Purcell principle,79 named for the case in which it 
was first briefly articulated, Purcell v. Gonzalez, has come to stand for an 
increasingly categorical rule that election laws cannot be changed close 
to an election,80 thus imposing severe time constraints on when voting 
rights lawyering can occur.81 And it is possible that the Independent State 
Legislature Theory, making its first appearance in the pandemic-era ballot 
receipt deadline cases, will attract even more criticism than the Purcell 
principle has thus far accumulated. 82 
Even before the pandemic, the Purcell principle had become widely 
recognized as a culprit standing in the way of voting rights lawyering.83 
The principle derived from the case—that election laws should be 
changed with caution for fear of causing “voter confusion and consequent 
 
 79 See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 30 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (mem.). 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 See Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 34 n.1 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); 
see also Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 47-48 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (mem.). 
 83 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
427 (2016) (urging the Court to limit its use of the Purcell principle when asked to intervene 
close to an election and to view it as only relevant to one of the various factors considered (the 
public interest factor) rather than a separate rule); Richard L. Hasen, You Don’t Have to Be a 
Structuralist to Hate the Supreme Court’s Dignitary Harm Election Law Cases, 64 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 465 (2010) (arguing that the Purcell Court was more concerned about the structure 
and functioning of the electoral system than about voters’ dignitary rights). 
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incentive to remain away from the polls”84—has been applied to function-
ally preclude the issuance of relief in election law cases close to an elec-
tion,85 except when such relief is sought by state defendants. 
A notable instance of the inconsistent application of Purcell occurred 
in the course of a challenge by Native voters to North Dakota’s voter 
identification law and was highlighted by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent from 
the decision to allow the law to go into effect for the 2018 General Elec-
tion.86 As a result of a district court injunction, the law was not in effect 
“during the primary election” and the “Secretary of State’s website an-
nounced for months the ID requirements as they existed under that injunc-
tion.”87 The Eight Circuit stayed that injunction, giving voters “a month 
to ‘adapt’ to the new regime.”88 The Supreme Court, in siding with the 
Eight Circuit, produced the “all too real risk of grand-scale voter confu-
sion,” as voters had reason to expect based on recent voting experiences 
that the law would not be in effect.89 
Even if consistently applied, Purcell is supported by the untested as-
sumption that implementing election laws on the books always minimizes 
voter confusion. There are reasons to believe that the consequences of 
voter confusion flowing from changes that make voting harder and easier 
are not symmetrical. Those resulting from making voting easier do not 
produce disenfranchised voters; those resulting from making voting 
harder do. Changes to election laws making it easier for voters to vote 
may enfranchise certain individuals who were not previously able to vote. 
And any confused voters (believing voting to be harder than it is) are no 
more harmed than under the status quo because they would not have voted 
anyway. But when changes make it harder for voters to vote, confused 
voters (believing voting to be easier than it is) may show up to vote and 
yet be prevented from doing so because they cannot meet more stringent 
requirements than anticipated. When changes to election laws are sought 
is no more relevant to whether voters are confused than how those laws 
have changed. 
The pandemic not only strengthened the arguments advanced by 
Purcell critics, but also garnered new Purcell critics. Justice Kagan’s dis-
senting opinion in DNC v. Wisconsin State Legislature, concerning Wis-
consin’s absentee ballot receipt deadline, made her the most prominent of 
 
 84 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006) (per curiam). 
 85 See supra note 83. 
 86 See Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10 at 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
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the new Purcell critics.90 One of the reasons the Court invoked for declin-
ing to modify Wisconsin’s absentee ballot receipt deadline was adherence 
to the Purcell principle: the change would occur six weeks before Elec-
tion Day.91 But as Justice Kagan noted, the Purcell principle should stand 
for no more than a “caution” against changes close to an election, not a 
“rule” that prevents any changes to election laws within a certain time 
period before the Election Day.92 
Purcell evinces not merely a status quo bias towards existing election 
laws but a legitimation of them. And a pandemic offers a forceful refuta-
tion of the advisability of adherence to status quo election laws. While 
there may be pragmatic reasons to follow the election laws we have al-
ways had, there is nothing inherently righteous about those laws. Indeed, 
as discussed prior, status quo pre-pandemic election laws may be inher-
ently flawed when applied to pandemic conditions.93 Any preference for 
status quo election laws must not rise to unconditional fealty. And if the 
application of the Purcell principle requires the maintenance of status quo 
election laws even under the most extreme conditions, that clearly sug-
gests that the principle is (over)ripe for reconsideration or recalibration. 
If Purcell is the recurring doctrinal villain, the Independent State 
Legislature Theory is the one that just arrived from out of town—and is 
already much maligned by leading scholars.94 It first appeared in a foot-
note by Justice Kavanaugh in DNC v. Wisconsin State Legislature95—and 
further support for it appeared in a subsequent dissenting opinion in 
Moore v. Circosta by Justice Gorsuch (declining to stay the extension of 
the North Carolina absentee ballot receipt deadline)96 and in a statement 
 
 90 See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 40-46 
(2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (mem.). 
 91 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2020) (per 
curiam). 
 92 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 42 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Bostelmann, 
977 F.3d at 644 (Rovner, J., dissenting)). 
 93 See supra Section I. 
 94 Ned Foley, #2DaysOut: How to Draw the Line on a State Legislature’s Electoral 
Power?, ELECTION L. BLOG (Nov. 1, 2020, 10:14 AM), https://perma.cc/N36A-SGCG; Rich-
ard Pildes, The WI District Court’s Important Decision on the Independent State Legislature 
Issue, ELECTION L. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2020, 10:16 AM), https://perma.cc/JSJ9-74KW; Nick 
Stephanopoulos, #2DaysOut: The Textual Problem with the Presidential Version of the Inde-
pendent State Legislature Argument, ELECTION L. BLOG (Nov. 1, 2020, 10:38 AM), 
https://perma.cc/4BES-X85A; Vikram D. Amar, Federal Court Review of State Court Inter-
pretations of State Laws that Regulate Federal Elections: Debunking the “Independent State 
Legislature” Notion Once and for All, and Keeping Federal Judges to Their Important but 
Limited Lanes (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Legal Stud. Research Paper, Working Paper No. 21-
02, 2020), https://perma.cc/JQJ2-2TTE. 
 95 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 34 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 96 See Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 47-48 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (mem.). 
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in Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar by Justice Alito (declin-
ing to stay the extension of the Pennsylvania absentee ballot receipt dead-
line).97 
As thus far articulated, the Independent State Legislature Theory 
draws from the text of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution, 
which provides that each state shall appoint its presidential electors “in 
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”98 Indeed, the theory 
takes the quoted language literally: it interprets the reference to “the Leg-
islature” as endowing special authority to the state legislature over other 
branches of government in providing for rules for Presidential elections. 
Thus, a state court “depart[ing] from the state election code enacted by 
the state legislature . . . presents a federal constitutional question.”99 
The stakes of recognizing the Independent State Legislature Theory 
as doctrine are evident in the Pennsylvania absentee ballot receipt dead-
line litigation.100 In the wake of the pandemic, the state legislature passed 
several laws to facilitate voting, notably by introducing no-excuse absen-
tee voting.101 Reform litigation was brought in state court to ensure that 
the rules governing no-excuse absentee voting did not disenfranchise and 
disadvantage voters.102 The litigation sought to relax rules governing, 
among other things, the deadline by which mail ballots must be re-
turned.103 Eventually, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that some 
of the challenged rules, including the absentee ballot receipt deadline, 
must be adjusted in light of the pandemic to fully give effect to the state 
constitution’s protections for the right to vote.104 
The Pennsylvania litigation stands out in this Article compared to the 
others described because it succeeded, at least initially and partially, be-
fore the state supreme court. Plaintiffs were able to secure remedies that 
enhanced voting rights beyond what state election law provided for.105 
That the case was brought in state court, as opposed to federal court, was 
no coincidence. Waning protections for the right to vote in federal court106 
have spurred voting rights lawyering in state courts. The partisan gerry-
mandering litigation from the last redistricting cycle demonstrates this 
 
 97 See Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1, 1-2 (2020) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (mem.). 
 98 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 99 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 34 n.1 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113, 
120 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)). 
 100 See Boockvar, 141 S. Ct at 1-2 (describing the issue as one of national importance). 
 101 Id. at 1. 
 102 See Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 352-53 (Pa. 2020). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 371-72. 
 105 Id. at 361. 
 106 See infra Section II(B). 
140 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:123 
dynamic well: while maps in Wisconsin, North Carolina, Ohio, and Mich-
igan survived legal challenges in federal court,107 they did not survive 
challenges in state courts in Pennsylvania108 and North Carolina.109 
The Pennsylvania litigation made clear that state courts are not only 
venues for cutting-edge reform litigation (like they were for partisan ger-
rymandering litigation) but also possibly the only venues where remedies 
to voting rights injuries can be found. And what happened after the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court’s decision also made clear the stakes of recog-
nizing the Independent State Legislature Theory as doctrine: voting rights 
victories secured in state courts can be taken away in federal courts. The 
Republican Party of Pennsylvania sued in federal court to reverse the de-
cision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.110 And ultimately, while the 
Supreme Court declined to overturn the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision,111 Justice Alito issued a statement pursuant to the case (joined 
by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch) that “there is a strong likelihood that 
the State Supreme Court decision violates the Federal Constitution,”112 
presumably under some version of the Independent State Legislature The-
ory. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Independent State Legislature 
Theory would require the Supreme Court to override a state supreme 
court’s decision interpreting its state constitution to give full effect to the 
voice of voters who cast valid ballots in an election (and whose ballots 
may not have arrived by Election Day due to no fault of their own). 
 
 107 The Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), 
where the Court found partisan gerrymandering claims non-justiciable under the federal con-
stitution, doomed the challenge to North Carolina’s maps, as well as to those of Wisconsin, 
Whitford v. Vos, No. 19-2066, 2019 WL 4571109 (7th Cir. July 11, 2019), Ohio, Householder 
v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 140 S. Ct. 101 (2019), and Michigan, Chatfield v. League 
of Women Voters, 140 S. Ct. 429 (2019). 
 108 League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 824-25 (2018) (finding 
partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution). 
 109 While the federal challenge to North Carolina’s maps failed because the Supreme 
Court refused to recognize federal constitutional claims against partisan gerrymandering, 
North Carolina state courts recognize partisan gerrymandering claims under the North Car-
olina state constitution. See Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18-CVS-014001, 2019 WL 
4569584 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Sept. 3, 2019). 
 110 First, various Republican officials and party affiliates sought a stay of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s order from the U.S. Supreme Court. Emergency Application for a Stay Pend-
ing the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Scarnati v. Boockvar, 141 
S. Ct. 644 (2020) (No. 20A53). They also subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court to hear 
the case on the merits. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. 
Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1 (2020) (No. 20-542). 
 111 Republican Party of Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. at 1. 
 112 Id. at 2. 
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B. Neglected Constitutional Protections 
I share the concern over and criticisms of both the Purcell principle 
and the Independent State Legislature Theory. Reform to facilitate voting 
rights lawyering will have to seriously contend with them. But I wish to 
devote the rest of this piece to outlining the longstanding misapplication 
of the Anderson/Burdick standard governing the right to vote under the 
federal constitution.113 After all, the federal constitutional standard sets 
the floor for protections for the right to vote beyond what state laws (stat-
utory and constitutional) and federal statutory laws provide. For voting 
rights lawyers, it is also the last line of defense. And yet, the 
Anderson/Burdick standard has done little to protect the right to vote. 
This is the case not because the standard is mis-specified, but be-
cause it is misapplied. The standard weighs two interests: the character 
and magnitude of burdens the challenged law imposes on voters against 
the state’s interests in maintaining the challenged law.114 As a resting prin-
ciple for a constitutional democracy that considers the right to vote to be 
fundamental,115 Anderson/Burdick is a sound one. It acknowledges that 
the political process needs regulations. For instance, we have verification 
methods to ensure that voters are in fact eligible to vote, do not vote more 
than once,116 and can cast their ballots freely and privately.117 It allows 
states to maintain election laws needed to regulate the political process, 
but not unjustifiably burdensome ones. And it is factually curious about 
burdens that election laws impose on voters, as well as about the state’s 
reasons for those election laws, too. The doctrine does not require that 
voting be entirely costless or maximally available to all eligible voters. It 
simply requires that election administration be backed up by reason. 
But even if the theory behind the standard is sound, the application 
of the standard has been deeply flawed. This is because the evidentiary 
demands on each element of the balancing test are not similarly rigorous. 
While burdens on voters must be proven with substantial empirical evi-
dence, the state’s interest in maintaining an election law can be supported 
with little more than a citation. Ever since Crawford v. Marion County, 
 
 113 See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 114 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 115 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 116 In every state except North Dakota, an eligible voter must register to vote before she 
can vote. Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 5, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/SF6T-DZH3. 
 117 Laws that require privacy sleeves for ballots serve this interest. See VOPP: Table 13: 
States That Are Required to Provide Secrecy Sleeves for Absentee/Mail Ballots, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES (May 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/8AXE-MCNU. 
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which upheld an Indiana voter ID law,118 states have to do little more to 
shore up the constitutionality of their election laws than to identify a state 
interest that the election laws satisfy and cite a Supreme Court opinion 
that recognizes that interest to be a valid one. 
To be sure, evidence of burdens imposed on voters in Crawford was 
wanting.119 But evidence of the state’s interest in maintaining the voter ID 
law at issue in Crawford—e.g., preventing in-person voter fraud and 
maintaining public confidence—was also wanting.120 Yet, since plaintiffs 
in the case launched a facial challenge against the law, they bore a heavy 
burden of persuasion and failed to meet it.121 Regardless of the procedural 
posture of Crawford itself, the decision has produced a one-sided eviden-
tiary standard for the balancing test. In the subsequent challenges to voter 
ID laws, states have defended their laws simply by citing the same inter-
ests the Court recognized in Crawford.122 Thus, while on paper Ander-
son/Burdick sets out an even-handed evaluation of how the interest of 
 
 118 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). For a full critique of how 
Crawford watered down meaningful judicial scrutiny of the state justification prong of the 
Anderson/Burdick analysis, see Pamela S. Karlan, Undue Burdens and Potential Opportuni-
ties in Voting Rights and Abortion Law, 93 IND. L.J. 139, 146-48 (2018). 
 119 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200 (noting that record evidence “does not provide us with the 
number of registered voters without photo identification,” nor “any concrete evidence of the 
burden imposed on voters who currently lack photo identification,” and that there was “virtu-
ally nothing about the difficulties faced by either indigent voters or voters with religious ob-
jections to being photographed”). 
 120 Id. at 191-97 (relying on little more than assertions of state interests). 
 121 Id. at 202. 
 122 See, e.g., ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that because in Crawford, the Supreme Court “did not require any showing from 
Indiana regarding past instances of fraud,” the state’s invocation of the same justifications was 
“sufficient.”); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 749-51 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing district court 
decision striking down Wisconsin’s voter ID law and explicitly identifying the state’s interest 
in maintaining confidence in its elections as a “legislative fact” that must simply be accepted 
as true); Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 632 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that the 
sufficiency of the state’s justification is a “legislative fact”); Lee v. Virginia State Bd. of 
Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 606-07 (4th Cir. 2016) (concluding state justification analysis after 
noting simply that the justifications Virginia advanced to support its voter ID law were “the 
same as those advanced by Indiana” in Crawford); Richardson v. Texas Sec’y of State, 978 
F.3d 220, 240 (5th Cir. 2020) (explicitly treating as precedential Crawford’s conclusion that 
“there is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the State’s interest” in preventing 
voter fraud despite the fact that “the record contain[ed] no evidence of any such fraud actually 
occurring in Indiana at any time in its history”) (citing Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194); Greater 
Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State for Alabama, 966 F.3d 1202, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 
2020), vacated, 992 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2021) (determining that because the “state interests 
espoused by Indiana in defending its voter ID law in Crawford . . . are the same ones advanced 
as justification for the Alabama photo voter ID law, . . . [i]t follows that the burden of 
presenting a photo ID in order to vote ‘is justified by relevant and legitimate state interests 
‘sufficiently weighty to justify’’ the burden on Alabama voters”) (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. 
at 191-97 and Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-289 (1992)). 
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states and voters stack up against each other, in reality it gives states a 
significant leg up. 
 The misapplication of Anderson/Burdick has doomed voting rights 
reform litigation. One of the virtues of Anderson/Burdick is that it is self-
updating: election laws that impose burdens on voting must be supported 
by a proper rationale. Circumstances can make burdens more severe; so-
cietal and technological change can erode prior justifications for election 
laws. By drastically altering the macroenvironment for voting, the pan-
demic made the first point crystal clear. Pandemic-necessitated practices 
like social distancing and shelter-in-place made voting in person unprec-
edentedly burdensome. And if states had not affirmatively made other 
modes of voting more accessible to voters, Anderson/Burdick should pro-
vide a viable claim. Yet, while there were many lawsuits seeking various 
accommodations in light of the COVID-19 pandemic bringing Ander-
son/Burdick claims,123 almost none prevailed.124 Even the Wisconsin law-
suits pursuing Anderson/Burdick claims and seeking relief that imposes 
little burden on election administration—the extension of absentee ballot 
receipt deadlines—were clear losers before the Supreme Court.125 
CONCLUSION 
The inability of voting rights lawyering, despite persistent and back-
breaking efforts, to secure limited relief for vulnerable individuals during 
a pandemic is an especially grievous consequence of our eroding set of 
legal protections for the right to vote. We must not only closely reexamine 
doctrines and theories that rubber stamp states’ electoral regimes, but also 
recommit to more robust legal protections for the right to vote. I join many 
others in suggesting the Anderson/Burdick standard as a place to start.126 
What is heartening is that the standard is itself sound. It must simply be 
 
 123 See, e.g., Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-CV-01552-JMC, No. 3:20-CV-01730-JMC, 
2020 WL 2617329 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020); Black Voters Matter Fund v. Raffensperger, 478 
F.Supp.3d 1278 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Third Amended Complaint at 58, Nielsen v. DeSantis, 469 
F.Supp.3d 1261 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (4:20CV236-RH-MJF); Complaint at 14, Mays v. Thurston, 
No. 4:20-CV-341 JM, 2020 WL 1531359 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2020); Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Request for Oral 
Argument at 10, Voto Latino Found. v. Hobbs, No. CV-19-05685-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 
1236352 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2020); Paher v. Cegavske, 457 F.Supp.3d 919, 927-29 (D. Nev. 
Apr. 30, 2020). 
 124 Few plaintiffs in the cases cited supra note 123 prevailed in court. Success tended to 
be attained through settlement. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement, Voto Latino Found. v. Hobbs, 
No. 2:19-CV-05685-DWL, 2020 WL 1236352 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2020); League of Women 
Voters of Virginia. v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 458 F. Supp. 3d 442 (W.D. Va. 2020). 
 125 See cases cited supra notes 72, 91 and accompanying text. 
 126 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 24; Joshua A. Douglas, Undue Deference to States in the 
2020 Election Litigation, 30 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming). 
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applied rigorously to what is on both sides of the balancing test. The pan-
demic taught us, in a painful way, how important it is to take seriously the 
burdens that circumstances impose on voters and require that our election 
laws be backed up by reason. 
